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Abstract—Here, a novel energy trading system is proposed
for demand-side management of a neighborhood area network
(NAN) consisting of a shared energy storage (SES) provider,
users with non-dispatchable energy generation, and an electricity
retailer. In a leader-follower Stackelberg game, the SES provider
first maximizes their revenue by setting a price signal and trading
energy with the grid. Then, by following the SES provider’s
actions, the retailer minimizes social cost for the users, i.e., the
sum of the total users’ cost when they interact with the SES and
the total cost for supplying grid energy to the users. A pricing
strategy, which incorporates mechanism design, is proposed to
make the system incentive-compatible by rewarding users who
disclose true energy usage information. A unique Stackelberg
equilibrium is achieved where the SES provider’s revenue is
maximized and the user-level social cost is minimized, which also
rewards the retailer. A case study with realistic energy demand
and generation data demonstrates 28% - 45% peak demand
reduction of the NAN, depending on the number of participating
users, compared to a system without SES. Simulation results
confirm that the retailer can also benefit financially, in addition
to the SES provider and the users.
Index Terms—Demand-side management, game theory, mech-
anism design, neighborhood area network, non-dispatchable
energy generation, shared energy storage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity demand-side management with distributed en-
ergy resources helps accommodate peak electricity demand
without the need for upgrading conventional power grid in-
frastructure. In particular, shared energy storage (SES) systems
such as community energy storages [1] can be effectively used
to exploit user-owned non-dispatchable energy generation, for
example, rooftop solar or wind energy generation, to regulate
users’ peak electricity demand. With this capability, SESs
would enable electricity retailers to effectively serve the energy
needs of neighborhood area networks (NANs) that consist of
small groups of residential buildings, for example, 50 house-
holds. In addition, SESs can facilitate user-centric demand-
side management solutions without end-users having to invest
in personal energy storage devices. Increasing interest in SES
systems has led to a range of projects worldwide exploring
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their feasibility for utilizing user-owned non-dispatchable en-
ergy generation for demand-side management [2].
User-centric demand-side management driven by electricity
retailers requires the knowledge of true energy usage informa-
tion of users, including their energy demand and generation,
for robust operation. However, users might intentionally misre-
port private information so as to gain personal cost benefits that
would challenge achieving system-wide objectives in demand-
side management [3]. Hence, smart pricing strategies capable
of motivating users to reveal true private information are
imperative for effective demand-side management [4], [5].
In this paper, a novel energy trading system is proposed for
demand-side management of a NAN that consists of an SES
provider, users with non-dispatchable energy generation, and
an electricity retailer. The SES is used to store surplus energy
from users’ non-dispatchable generation and discharged when
electricity demand is high. The energy transactions between
the SES and the users as well as the energy transactions
between the power grid and both the users and the SES are
coordinated by the retailer. The interplay between the SES
provider and the retailer is formulated as a non-cooperative
Stackelberg game where the SES provider (leader) moves first
to maximize revenue by setting a price signal and trading
energy with the grid through the retailer. Then, by following
the SES provider’s actions, the retailer (follower) minimizes
social cost for the users and determines energy amounts for
the users to trade with the grid and the SES. Here, the social
cost is defined as the sum of the total users’ cost when they
interact with the SES and the cost incurred by the retailer in
supplying grid energy to the users. Insights from the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism are applied to the retailer’s
social cost minimization problem to develop a pricing strategy
that can motivate users to reveal true energy usage information
to the retailer. This paper has the following contributions:
• The Stackelberg game has a unique pure strategy equilib-
rium where the SES provider maximizes revenue and the
retailer minimizes the social cost of participating users.
• The system is incentive-compatible as participating users
can only minimize their personal energy costs by reveal-
ing their true energy usage information.
• In addition to providing financial benefits to the SES
provider and the participating users, our solution also
enables the retailer to benefit financially by coordinating
the energy transactions between the grid and the system.
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Mechanism design has been widely applied to explore
demand-side management that achieves socially desirable out-
comes while ensuring incentive-compatibility for users. For
instance, mechanism design has been utilized in [6] to develop
a pricing strategy that rewards users who reveal true private
information in a load curtailment scheme that minimizes
aggregate user inconvenience due to load curtailment. In
[4], mechanism design has been used to develop a demand-
scheduling program that minimizes the aggregate user cost
and provides benefits to users who reveal true energy usage
information. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the
first to leverage mechanism design with Stackelberg game the-
ory to study the feasibility of integrating an SES system with
user-owned non-dispatchable energy generation for demand-
side management of a NAN by minimizing social energy cost
and assuring incentive-compatibility for the users.
This work has three key differences to our previous work
[7]. First, in contrast to allowing users to minimize personal
costs selfishly, the proposed system minimizes total users’
energy costs from a social planner’s perspective. Second, the
users in the proposed system interact with the SES provider
through the retailer as a result of minimizing the social cost
whereas users in the system in [7] directly interact with the
SES provider. In addition, the solution here is capable of
benefiting the retailer for coordinating grid energy with the
users and the SES unlike the solution presented in [7].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents related work, and Section III describes system
models of the energy trading system. Section IV explains
the formulation of the energy trading system, and Section V
presents simulation results. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The concept of sharing energy storage systems for demand-
side management has gained attention in both industry and
research communities [2], [8]–[12]. For instance, sharing
household-distributed energy storages through joint-ownership
between domestic users and network operators has been
explored in [8] to facilitate demand response. Sharing user-
owned energy storages for demand response has been studied
in [10] while demonstrating an optimal policy to determine
the shareable energy storage capacity to network operators.
Various algorithms based on mixed-integer linear program-
ming have been proposed for optimal scheduling of electric
appliances of users using SES systems [9], [11].
Mechanism design and game theory have been widely
used to investigate energy management problems, including
demand-side management, with strategic user behavior [5],
[13]–[18]. Utilizing auction mechanisms with block-chain
technology has gained growing interest in peer-to-peer en-
ergy trading markets, including energy trading among electric
vehicles, to elicit true local information from users [19]. An
economically efficient pricing strategy for wholesale electricity
markets is proposed in [15] using the VCG mechanism.
Mechanism design has been used to develop a pricing strategy
in [5] that effectively motivates users to report true energy
information to the electricity retailer in an energy consump-
tion scheduling game among users. In contrast, this paper
applies insights of mechanism design in a different demand-
side management setting where users with non-dispatchable
energy generation trade energy with an SES. In the literature,
combining incentive compatibility for users in social cost
minimization generally results in bi-level structures where
users, at the second level, react to the decisions taken by
the social planner [4], [5], [14], [15]. However, in this paper,
combining incentive compatibility for users and a Stackelberg
game between the retailer and the SES provider leads to a tri-
level structure where users, at the third level, implicitly react
to the decisions taken in the Stackelberg game.
III. SYSTEM MODELS
The energy trading system consists of energy users, an
electricity retailer, and an SES owned by a third-party that
provides storage services [1], referred to as the SES provider,
as depicted in Fig. 1. This section explains the role of each
entity and the energy cost models used in the system. The
definitions of notations in this paper are summarized in Table I.
A. Demand-side Model
The set of all users in the NAN, A, is divided into two
sets, participating users P and non-participating users N .
Thus, A = P ∪ N . The users P have non-dispatchable
energy generation systems, for example, rooftop solar panels,
without local energy storage facilities. The users P participate
in the system by trading energy with the grid and the SES
through the electricity retailer. The retailer coordinates the
energy transactions between the grid and both the users A
and the SES in addition to the energy transactions between
the SES and the users P . The SES is shared among the users
P to store surplus energy from their local energy generation.
The users N may have non-dispatchable energy generation
systems without storage and do not participate in the energy
trading optimization framework. They are considered as the
traditional energy users of the grid. If a user in N owns a
local energy generation system, they sell the excess energy
generated directly to the grid through the retailer.
The time period T , typically one day, is divided into H
equal time steps and the control time t = 1, 2, · · · , H . The
users P are divided into two time-dependent sets; P+(t) and
P−(t). Surplus energy at user n ∈ P at time t is given by
sn(t) = gn(t)− dn(t). (1)
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Fig. 1. Configuration of the energy trading system.
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TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATION.
Variable/parameter Definition Variable/parameter Definition
A Set of all users in the NAN. P+(t) Set of surplus energy users at time t.
P Set of participating users. P−(t) Set of deficit energy users at time t.
N Set of non-participating users en(t) Energy traded by user n with the grid at time t.
T Entire time period of analysis. sn(t) Surplus energy of user n at time t.
H Total number of time steps in T . es(t) Energy exchanged between the grid and the SES attime t.
I Total number of users in P . b(t) The charge level of the SES at the end of time t.
η+, η− Charging and discharging inefficiencies of the SES. E(t) Total energy load on the grid at time t.
α Leakage rate of the SES; (0 < α ≤ 1). EA(t) Total grid load of the users A at time t.
QM Maximum energy capacity of the SES. EP (t) Total grid load of the users P at time t.
Emax
Maximum load that the grid can support without
overloading it. EN (t) Total grid load of the users N at time t.
R Revenue of the SES provider. En(t) Feasible strategy set of user n at time t.
Q Feasible strategy set of the SES provider. kn(t) Payment made by user n to the retailer at time t.
G Stackelberg game between the SES provider and theretailer. Cn(t) Personal energy cost of user n at time t.
τ Small positive value. sˆ(t) Declared surplus energy profile by the users P to theretailer at time t.
r Iteration number. sˆ−n(t)
Declared surplus energy profile by all other users
P\n to the retailer at time t.
L SES provider. U(t) Net payoff of the retailer at time t.
F Retailer. pg(t) Unit energy price paid by the retailer to the grid attime t.
dn(t) Electricity demand of user n at time t. ps(t) Unit energy price of the SES at time t.
gn(t) Energy generation of user n at time t. δt, φt Positive time-of-use tariff constants at time t.
xn(t) Energy traded with the SES by user n at time t. Ct Social cost at time t.
If gn(t) > dn(t), i.e., when sn(t) > 0, then user n ∈ P+(t).
If gn(t) < dn(t), i.e., when sn(t) < 0, then user n ∈ P−(t).
For each user n ∈ P , it is assumed that there is a
local energy controlling device. All these controlling devices
communicate with a central controlling device at the retailer
that performs the energy cost optimization on behalf of the
users P . In doing so, the retailer determines users’ optimal
energy amounts that are traded with the SES and the grid.
For each user n ∈ P , en(t) > 0 if they buy energy from the
grid, and en(t) < 0 if they sell energy to the grid. Additionally,
xn(t) > 0 if the user sells energy to the SES, and xn(t) < 0
if they buy energy from the SES. Then, the energy balance at
user n gives en(t) = xn(t) + dn(t)− gn(t). Hence, with (1),
en(t) = xn(t)− sn(t). (2)
The optimal values for en(t) and xn(t) are determined day-
ahead by the retailer using the reported information of sn(t) by
the users P . The users P generate information of sn(t) using
their next day’s energy generation and demand forecasts, and
we assume the users P have accurate energy forecasts 1. Since
the surplus energy levels of the users P are private information
and unknown to the retailer, the reported surplus energy level
by user n ∈ P is denoted by sˆn(t) to highlight that the user
can misreport this information to the retailer. Then we use
xˆn(t) and eˆn(t) to denote the SES and grid energy transactions
determined by the retailer for user n at time t, respectively.
1 To make the game-theoretic analysis tractable, we assume accurate energy
forecasts in this paper. On that note, as an interesting future work, to handle
energy generation and demand forecast errors, the game-theoretic framework
introduced in Section IV can be combined with stochastic game theory with
imperfect information [20].
It is considered that 0 ≤ xˆi(t) ≤ sˆi(t), ∀i ∈ P+(t) and
sˆj(t) ≤ xˆj(t) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ P−(t). Therefore, with (2),
−sˆi(t) ≤ eˆi(t) ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ P+(t), t ∈ T ,
0 ≤ eˆj(t) ≤ −sˆj(t), ∀j ∈ P−(t), t ∈ T .
(3)
B. Shared Energy Storage Model
Here, the storage model is similar to that in [17]. In addition
to being charged/discharged with the users P , the SES may
exchange energy es(t) with the grid at time t through the
retailer. In this paper, es(t) > 0 if the SES charges from the
grid, and es(t) < 0 if it discharges energy to the grid.
Consider separating xˆn(t) and es(t) such that xˆn(t) =
xˆ+n (t) − xˆ−n (t) and es(t) = e+s (t) − e−s (t). Here,
xˆ+n (t), e
+
s (t) ≥ 0 are the charging energy profiles, and
xˆ−n (t), e
−
s (t) ≥ 0 are the discharging energy profiles at
time t. Given that, all optimal SES energy strategies satisfy
xˆ+n (t)xˆ
−
n (t) = 0 and e
+
s (t)e
−
s (t) = 0 at each time t to prevent
simultaneous charging and discharging of the SES [7]. We
introduce η+ and η− such that 0 < η+ ≤ 1 and η− ≥ 1
to consider conversion losses of the SES. For example, if
xˆ+ energy is transferred to the SES, only η+xˆ+ energy is
effectively stored. Conversely, to get xˆ− energy, the SES has
to be discharged by η−xˆ−. If the charge level of the SES at
the beginning of time t is b(t− 1), then b(t) is given by
b(t) = αb(t− 1) + η+
(
e+s (t) +
∑
n∈P
xˆ+n (t)
)
− η−
(
e−s (t) +
∑
n∈P
xˆ−n (t)
)
. (4)
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At each time t, b(t) is bounded above by QM and below
by 0 [17]. Therefore,
0 ≤ b(t) ≤ QM , ∀t ∈ T (5)
where b(t) is calculated using (4). To ensure the continuous
operation of the SES for the next day and to prevent over-
charging or over-discharging of the SES, it is specified [21]
b(H) = b(0) (6)
where b(0) is the initial charge level of the SES that is
considered to be within the safe operating region of the SES.
C. Energy Cost Models
The retailer buys electricity from the grid at cost Dt at time
t. If the retailer buys E(t) amount of energy from the grid at
time t, then Dt is calculated by
Dt = φtE(t)
2 + δtE(t) (7)
where φt and δt are determined according to a day-ahead
market clearing process [17]. The cost function in (7) can
approximate piecewise linear pricing models used in current
electricity markets [22] and is widely used in the smart grid lit-
erature [16], [22]. In the system, E(t) = es(t)+EN (t)+EP(t)
where EP(t) =
∑
n∈P eˆn(t). Note that it is possible to exist
either EN (t) ≥ 0 or EN (t) ≤ 0 at time t. EN (t) < 0 occurs
if some or all users in N have local energy generation systems
that produce more energy than the total energy demand of the
users N at time t. Using (7), the unit energy price paid by the
retailer to the grid at time t is given by
pg(t) = φtE(t) + δt. (8)
It is considered that E(t) > 0 for non-negative pricing in (8)
and assumed E(t) < Emax. Additionally, energy transmission
losses are neglected within the NAN due to the short proximity
between its elements [23]. The SES provider sets a price ps(t)
for the traded energy amount xˆn(t) by each user n ∈ P and
trades es(t) with the retailer at the price pg(t).
IV. ENERGY TRADING SYSTEM
This section explains the energy trading interaction between
the SES provider and the retailer by using a non-cooperative
Stackelberg game. Stackelberg games are used to explore
multi-level decision-making processes. Generally, in a Stack-
elberg game, one player acts as a leader and moves first to
select their strategies. The rest of the players are followers
and react to the decisions made by the leader to maximize
their profits [24]. In this paper, the SES provider acts as
the leader by moving first to make energy trading decisions,
(ps(t), es(t)), ∀t ∈ T , and maximizes revenue. By following
the SES provider’s decisions, the retailer determines the grid
energy allocations, eˆn(t), ∀n ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T . The solutions to
the Stackelberg game are derived by using backward induction
[20]. Thus, the actions of the retailer are derived first based on
the knowledge of the SES provider’s actions. Then the analysis
proceeds backwards to find the SES provider’s actions.
A. Objective of the Electricity Retailer
To determine eˆn(t), ∀n ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T , the retailer
minimizes the social cost that is the sum of the total cost
for the users P when they interact with the SES and the cost
for the retailer for supplying grid energy to the users P . The
social cost at time t is given by
Ct =
∑
n∈P
(
−ps(t)xˆn(t) + pg(t)eˆn(t)
)
. (9)
By using (2) and (8), (9) can be written as a function of EP(t)
such that
Ct(EP(t)) = φtEP(t)2 +
(
φt(EN (t) + es(t)) + δt
− ps(t)
)
EP(t)− ps(t)
∑
n∈P
sˆn(t). (10)
In response to suitable (ps(t), es(t)), ∀t ∈ T of the SES
provider, the retailer minimizes (10) at each time t as
min
EP(t) ∈ E
Ct(EP(t)) (11)
where E =∏In=1 En(t), and En(t) subjects to constraints (3).
The objective function in (11) is strictly convex with respect
to EP(t). Also, its feasible strategy set E is convex, closed,
and non-empty because it is only subject to linear constraints.
Hence, (11) has a unique solution with respect to EP(t) [25].
The unique optimal solution E˜P(t) in (11) for given
(ps(t), es(t)) is found by using
∂Ct(EP(t))
∂EP(t)
= 0 that gives
E˜P(t) =
1
2
(
φ−1t (ps(t)− δt)− EN (t)− es(t)
)
. (12)
Since EP(t) =
∑
n∈P eˆn(t), there can be multiple combi-
nations for the grid energy allocation of the users P , eˆ(t) =
(eˆ1(t), · · · , eˆI(t)), that satisfy (12). However, the elements in
eˆ(t) should satisfy (3). Hence, any tuple of eˆ(t) that satisfies
both (12) and (3) forms the optimal solution for (11). Once
E˜P(t) is found by using (12), the corresponding grid energy
allocation of the users P at time t, ˜ˆe(t), is found by
˜ˆen(t) =
{
E˜P(t)sˆn(t)∑
n∈P sˆn(t)
, if all P are either surplus or deficit,
0, if P has both types of users.
(13)
Once ˜ˆen(t) is found, the corresponding ˜ˆxn(t) can be found
using (2). Clearly, (12) is a function of ps(t) and es(t) and
hence, it does not guarantee that any values for (ps(t), es(t))
would result in ˜ˆen(t) satisfying (3). Therefore, constraints are
considered in the SES provider’s revenue maximization so that
its selection of (ps(t), es(t)) ensures ˜ˆen(t) in (13) satisfies
constraints (3). The details are given in Section IV-C.
The users P may not disclose true surplus energy levels, and
this may lead to inefficient results in the above optimization
[26]. Hence, we are interested in a mechanism that motivates
the users P to report their true information about sn(t) to the
retailer or, in other words, an incentive-compatible mechanism.
In game theory context, a mechanism is said to be incentive-
compatible if each user can achieve minimized personal cost
by being truthful in their actions [26]. To this end, we are
interested in utilizing the VCG mechanism that can induce
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 5
reporting true sn(t), ∀t ∈ T to the retailer as the dominant
strategy for user n ∈ P . A dominant strategy refers to a
strategy where a self-interested user minimizes their personal
cost regardless of other users’ strategies [26].
B. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism for Energy Trading
The VCG mechanism is a well-known solution for obtaining
local information from users in resource allocation settings
[26]. In a VCG mechanism-based energy allocation setting,
users are asked to reveal their energy usage information, e.g.,
surplus energy levels of the users P , to determine energy prices
charged to users. In particular, the payments are designed such
that users are motivated to reveal local information truthfully.
At time t, user n ∈ P pays kn(t) to the retailer for their
grid energy transaction eˆn(t). Then, for each user n ∈ P ,
Cn(t) = −ps(t)xˆn(t) + kn(t) (14)
where −ps(t)xˆn(t) is the cost paid to the SES provider.
We take s∗(t) = (sˆ1(t), · · · , sn(t), · · · , sˆI(t)) to denote the
case when user n reports their true surplus energy level. In
response to any tuple sˆ(t) = (sˆ1(t), . . . , sˆI(t)), the retailer, by
using the VCG mechanism, selects the grid energy allocation
eˆ(sˆ(t)) ≡ eˆ(t) by solving (11) as described in Section IV-A
and structures the payments kn(sˆ(t)) ≡ kn(t) as
kn(sˆ(t)) = pg(sˆ(t))eˆn(sˆ(t)) +
∑
m∈P\n
(
−ps(t)xˆm(sˆ(t))
+ pg(sˆ(t))eˆm(sˆ(t))
)
− hn(sˆ−n(t)). (15)
Here, hn(sˆ−n(t)) is a function that depends on
the declared surplus energy profile by all other
users P\n to the retailer at time t given by
sˆ−n(t) = (sˆ1(t), . . . , sˆn−1(t), sˆn+1(t), . . . , sˆI(t)). To
determine hn(sˆ−n(t)), we use the popular choice referred to
as Clarke tax [26]. Then we take
hn(sˆ−n(t)) =
∑
m∈P\n
(
− ps(t)xˆm(sˆ−n(t))
+ pg(sˆ−n(t))eˆm(sˆ−n(t))
)
. (16)
Here, eˆm(sˆ−n(t)) and xˆm(sˆ−n(t)) denote the grid and SES
energy transactions of user m ∈ P\n at time t, respectively,
after solving (11) without user n in the system. Similarly,
pg(sˆ−n(t)) denotes the grid price paid by the retailer, as per
(8), after solving (11) without user n in the system. The case
without user n in the system refers to when user n is neither
a participating user nor a non-participating user, i.e., when
n /∈ A. Thus, (16) implies hn(sˆ−n(t)) is the social cost of
the other users P\n in (11) without user n in the system. By
directly following this argument, we can rewrite (15) as
kn(sˆ(t)) = pg(sˆ(t))eˆn(sˆ(t)) + hn(sˆ(t))− hn(sˆ−n(t)) (17)
where hn(sˆ(t)) =
∑
m∈P\n
(
−ps(t)xˆm(sˆ(t)) +
pg(sˆ(t))eˆm(sˆ(t))
)
is the social cost of the other users
P\n in (11) with user n in the system. Hence, kn(sˆ(t)) is
the difference between the social costs of the other users
P\n in (11) with and without user n in the system plus the
retailer’s cost for supplying eˆn(sˆ(t)).
It is important that when user n ∈ P+(t), they receive an
income for selling energy (i.e., kn(t) < 0), and when user n ∈
P−(t), they incur an expense for buying energy (i.e., kn(t) >
0). Proposition 1 demonstrates the proposed mechanism yields
this property.
Proposition 1. The payment structure in (15) results in an
income for user n (kn(t) < 0) when n ∈ P+(t) and an
expense (kn(t) > 0) when n ∈ P−(t).
Proof. Using (2), the last two terms of (17) can be derived as
hn(sˆ(t))−hn(sˆ−n(t)) = ps(t)
(
EP\n(sˆ−n(t))−EP\n(sˆ(t))
)
−
(
pg(sˆ−n(t))EP\n(sˆ−n(t))− pg(sˆ(t))EP\n(sˆ(t))
)
(18)
where EP\n(sˆ(t)) =
∑
m∈P\n eˆm(sˆ(t)) and
EP\n(sˆ−n(t)) =
∑
m∈P\n eˆm(sˆ−n(t)) are the total grid load
of all other users P\n at time t with and without user n in
the system, respectively. If we denote the total grid load of
all participating users at time t in (11) without user n in the
system by EP(sˆ−n(t)), then EP(sˆ−n(t)) = EP\n(sˆ−n(t))
because, in this case, user n is not in the system, i.e., n /∈ A.
If we denote the total grid load of all participating users at
time t in (11) with user n in the system by EP(sˆ(t)), then
EP(sˆ(t)) = EP\n(sˆ(t)) + eˆn(sˆ(t)) since n ∈ P .
At optimality in (11), the total grid load of the participating
users only depends on φt, δt, EN (t), ps(t), and es(t) (see
(12)) that are considered to be given and hence, fixed at time
t. Hence, EP(sˆ(t)) = EP(sˆ−n(t)). Then, E(t) remains the
same at optimality of (11) in both cases with and without
user n in the system. Therefore, (8) reflects pg(sˆ−n(t)) =
pg(sˆn(t)). Thus, from (17) and (18),
kn(sˆ(t)) = ps(t)eˆn(sˆ(t)). (19)
Since the SES price ps(t) > 0, (19) implies that kn(t) < 0
when user n ∈ P+(t) with eˆn(t) < 0, and kn(t) > 0 when
user n ∈ P−(t) with eˆn(t) > 0.
Clearly, (19) implies that the retailer adopts the same price
as the SES provider for unit grid energy traded by user n ∈ P .
It is assumed that the users N pay the same unit energy price
as the users P for their grid energy transactions.
By using a similar explanation to Theorem 10.4.2 in [26],
we confirm, by Proposition 2, that the VCG payment structure
ensures the disclosure of true surplus energy levels to the re-
tailer is a dominant strategy for each user in P that minimizes
their personal cost in the system.
Proposition 2. Revealing true surplus energy levels is a
dominant-strategy for each user n ∈ P when solving (11) with
the payment structure (15) for given feasible (ps(t), es(t)).
Proof. Consider user n’s problem is to choose the best strategy
for sˆn(t) that minimizes their personal cost, Cn(sˆ(t)) ≡
Cn(t), given in (14). As a shorthand, denote sˆ(t) =
(sˆn(t), sˆ−n(t)) and s∗(t) = (sn(t), sˆ−n(t)). The best
strategy for user n is the one that solves
min
sˆn(t)
Cn(sˆ(t)) ≡ min
sˆn(t)
(
− ps(t)xˆn(sˆ(t)) + kn(sˆ(t))
)
. (20)
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where kn(sˆ(t)) is given by (15). Since hn(sˆ−n(t)) does not
depend on sˆn(t), it is sufficient for user n to solve
min
sˆn(t)
(
− ps(t)xˆn(sˆ(t)) + pg(sˆ(t))eˆn(sˆ(t))
+
∑
m∈P\n
(
−ps(t)xˆm(sˆ(t)) + pg(sˆ(t))eˆm(sˆ(t))
))
(21)
by excluding hn(sˆ−n(t)) from (20).
Given sˆ(t), the retailer picks a grid energy allocation eˆ(t) ∈
E for the users P by minimizing the social cost in (9). Hence,
by disaggregating the cost of user n and the cost of other users
P\n in (9), we can rewrite the retailer’s problem as
min
eˆ(t)
(
− ps(t)xˆn(sˆ(t)) + pg(sˆ(t))eˆn(sˆ(t))
+
∑
m∈P\n
(
−ps(t)xˆm(sˆ(t)) + pg(sˆ(t))eˆm(sˆ(t))
))
. (22)
Clearly, from (21) and (22), user n and the retailer try to
minimize the same objective function however, with respect to
sˆn(t) and eˆ(t), respectively. Hence, the best way for user n to
minimize their personal cost is by influencing the retailer to
pick an eˆ(t) ∈ E that minimizes the cost in (21). This implies
user n would like to disclose sˆn(t) that leads the retailer to
pick an eˆ(t) ∈ E which solves
min
eˆ(t)
(
− ps(t)xˆn(s∗(t)) + pg(s∗(t))eˆn(s∗(t))
+
∑
m∈P\n
(
−ps(t)xˆm(s∗(t)) + pg(s∗(t))eˆm(s∗(t))
))
.
(23)
Hence, user n ∈ P leads the retailer to select the choice that
they most prefer by reporting true surplus energy level, i.e.,
sˆn(t) = sn(t), regardless of the reported surplus energy levels
by the other users. Hence, revealing true surplus energy at each
time t is a dominant strategy for user n ∈ P .
In the system, the retailer coordinates the energy trans-
actions between the grid and the NAN to maintain the en-
ergy balance. Therefore, a mechanism wherein the retailer
simultaneously benefits, in addition to the SES provider and
the users P , leads to a better operating and economically
viable environment. The conditions in Proposition 3 assure
the proposed VCG mechanism can achieve this in the system.
Proposition 3. The payment (15) produces a non-negative
payoff for the retailer across T given that at time t ∈ T
ps(t) ≤M(t), if EA(t) < 0,
ps(t) ≥M(t), otherwise.
}
(24)
where M(t) = φt(es(t) + EN (t)) + δt.
Proof. At time t ∈ T , the set P can have either only surplus
users, only deficit users, or both types of users. Hence, we
consider all these three different cases in the proof. At time t,
the retailer buys energy from the grid at pg(t) in (8), and the
users A trade grid energy with the retailer at ps(t) as shown
with Proposition 1. However, the SES provider trades es(t)
at the same grid price pg(t) and hence, the retailer receives
zero payoffs from the SES provider’s grid energy transactions.
Therefore, the retailer’s net payoff at time t is given by
U(t) = (ps(t)− pg(t))EA(t). (25)
Note that, here, we focus on the temporal change of sign, i.e.,
plus or minus, of EP(t) due to different types of users in P .
First, assume time t has only surplus users in P . Then,
eˆn(t) ≤ 0, ∀n ∈ P and hence, EP(t) ≤ 0. Thus, in this case,
it is possible to exist either EA(t) < 0 or EA(t) > 0 because
EA(t) = EP(t) + EN (t) and EN (t) ≥ 0 or EN (t) ≤ 0. If
EA(t) < 0, then ps(t) ≤ pg(t) results in a non-negative payoff
in (25). If EA(t) > 0, then ps(t) ≥ pg(t) gives a non-negative
payoff in (25). Given pg(t) = φt(E˜P(t)+EN (t)+es(t))+δt
where E˜P(t) is given by (12), ps(t) ≤ pg(t) gives ps(t) ≤
M(t). Similarly, ps(t) ≥ pg(t) results in ps(t) ≥M(t).
Now, assume time t has only deficit users in P . Then,
eˆn(t) ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ P and hence, EP(t) ≥ 0. Hence, with
similar arguments to the previous case, it is possible to exist
either EA(t) < 0 or EA(t) > 0. If EA(t) > 0, then
ps(t) ≥ pg(t) (or ps(t) ≥ M(t)) gives a non-negative
payoff in (25), and if EA(t) < 0, then ps(t) ≤ pg(t) (or
ps(t) ≤M(t)) gives a non-negative payoff in (25).
Finally, assume time t has both surplus and deficit users
in P . According to (13), eˆn(t) = 0, ∀n ∈ P that implies the
payoff in (25) is equal to (ps(t)−pg(t))EN (t). If EN (t) ≥ 0,
then ps(t) ≥ pg(t) (or ps(t) ≥ M(t)) gives a non-negative
payoff in (25), and if EN (t) ≤ 0, then ps(t) ≤ pg(t) (or
ps(t) ≤M(t)) gives a non-negative payoff in (25).
Under these conditions, the sum of U(t) across T leads to
a non-negative payoff for the retailer.
Therefore, to obtain a non-negative payoff for the retailer,
the SES provider’s selection of es(t) and ps(t) can be adjusted
such that the conditions in (24) are satisfied.
C. Objective of the Shared Energy Storage Provider
The SES provider maximizes revenue R by trading energy
with the users P and the grid through the retailer. Then
R =
H∑
t=1
(
−ps(t)
∑
n∈P
xˆn(t)− pg(t)es(t)
)
. (26)
As per backward induction, by substituting the retailer’s strat-
egy (12) in (26), the SES provider’s revenue maximization is
given by
max
ρ∈Q
H∑
t=1
(λps(t)
2 + µps(t) + νes(t)
2 + ξes(t)) (27)
where ρ = (ps, es) with ps = (ps(1), · · · , ps(H))T and
es = (es(1), · · · , es(H))T . Additionally, λ = − 12φ−1t , µ =
( 12 (EN (t) + φ
−1
t δt) −
∑
n∈P sˆn(t)), ν = − 12φt, and ξ =− 12 (φtEN (t)+ δt). As recognized in Section IV-A, to ensure
˜ˆen(t) in (13) satisfies (3), the SES provider selects ps(t) and
es(t) at time t such that∑
n∈P −sˆn(t) ≤ E˜P(t) ≤ 0, if all P are surplus,
0 ≤ E˜P(t) ≤
∑
n∈P −sˆn(t), if all P are deficit,
E˜P(t) = 0, if P has both types of users

(28)
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where E˜P(t) is given by (12). Thus, the SES provider’s
feasible strategy set Q is subject to (5), (6), (24), and (28).
Note that (27) is a convex optimization problem that can be
solved by using optimization algorithms such as the interior
point algorithm [25]. It also has a unique solution because the
objective function is strictly convex with respect to ρ, and Q is
non-empty, closed, and convex due to linear constraints [25].
D. Non-cooperative Stackelberg Game
In this system, the Stackelberg game between the SES
provider and the retailer can be given by the strategic form
of G ≡ 〈{L,F}, {Q, E}, {R,Ct}〉 where the SES provider L
is the leader and the retailer F is the follower.
Proposition 4. The game G has a unique pure strategy
Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof. In the system, the energy cost minimization (11) has
a unique solution for given (ps(t), es(t)) and that is given
by E˜P(t) (Section IV-A). Given E˜P(t), the optimization
problem of the SES provider in (27) also has a unique solution
(Section IV-C). Therefore, according to backward induction,
the game G has a unique pure strategy Stackelberg equilibrium
(ρ∗, E∗P) where E
∗
P = (E
∗
P(1), · · · , E∗P(H)), and E∗P(t) is
found by substituting the tth element of the optimal solution
of (27), i.e., ρ∗(t) = (p∗s(t), e∗s(t)), in (12) [20].
The equilibrium (ρ∗, E∗P) of the game G satisfies
Ct(E
∗
P(t),ρ
∗) ≤ Ct(EP(t),ρ∗), ∀EP(t) ∈ E , ∀t ∈ T ,
(29)
R(E∗P ,ρ
∗) ≥ R(E∗P ,ρ), ∀ρ ∈ Q. (30)
As shown in Algorithm 1, a two-step iterative algorithm,
similar to the one in [7] that was shown to converge, was
developed to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium
Step 1:
1: r ← 1.
2: if r = 1
3: The SES provider selects a feasible starting point for ρ
and communicates it to the retailer.
4: else
5: The SES provider maximizes (26) subject to (5), (6),
(24), and (28) using E˜P(t),
∑
n∈P ˜ˆxn(t), ∀t ∈ T and
communicates ρ to the retailer.
6: end if
Step 2:
7: The retailer determines (˜ˆen(t), ˜ˆxn(t)), ∀n ∈ P, ∀t ∈
T using ρ, (12), (13), and (2) and announces
E˜P(t),
∑
n∈P ˜ˆxn(t), ∀t ∈ T back to the SES provider.
8: r ← r + 1.
9: Repeat from 2 until ‖ρ(r) − ρ(r−1)‖2/‖ρ(r)‖2 ≤ τ . Here,
ρ(r) refers to ρ calculated at iteration r.
10: Return E˜P(t), ∀t ∈ T and ρ as the equilibrium.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To numerically analyze the performance of the proposed
system, a residential community of 40 users with photovoltaic
(PV) power generation is considered. The demand profiles of
the users P are varied among the users such that their average
demand profile is equal to the average daily domestic electric-
ity demand profile in the Western Power Network in Australia
on a typical spring day [27]. For example, when there are 10
participating users, demand profiles of 5 users are generated by
scaling down the demand profile in [27] with scaling factors
changing from 0.84 to 0.92 in 0.02 steps. For the other 5 users,
the demand profiles are generated by scaling up the demand
profile in [27] with scaling factors changing from 1.08 to 1.16
in 0.02 steps. For each user in N , the same demand profile
as the one in [27] is assigned. For each user in P , PV power
generation profile is the same as the average domestic PV
power generation profile in the Western Power Network on
a typical spring day [27]. The users N are considered to be
energy users without PV power generation capabilities. We
selected H = 48, QM = 80 kWh, α = 0.9(1/48), η+ = 0.9,
η− = 1.1 [17], and b(0) = 0.25QM . In simulations, φ is
selected such that φpeak = 1.5× φoff-peak, and peak period for
the energy demand is taken as 16 : 00 − 23 : 00. Here, φpeak
is selected such that the range of the predicted price signal,
(pg(1), · · · , pg(H)), that the retailer pays to the grid is the
same as the range of the time-of-use price signal in [28]. δt
is set as a constant across T such that the average predicted
grid price is the same as the average reference price signal.
A. Preliminary Study of the Proposed System
Here, the behavior of the proposed system is compared with
a baseline system without an SES where the users P trade
energy only with the grid through the retailer. In the baseline,
each user in P is charged with a price pg(t), calculated as per
(8), for their unit grid energy consumption.
In Fig. 2, the price signal of the SES provider is equal to
that of the retailer used to trade grid energy with the users P
(see (19)). At midday, when there is excess PV energy, the
SES provider and the retailer in the proposed system pay a
higher price to purchase energy from the users P than in the
baseline. During peak demand hours, when there is insufficient
PV energy to supply users’ energy demand, participation in the
proposed system helps to decrease the energy buying price for
the users, and the users P transfer some of their peak energy
demand to the SES. In this way, the proposed system reduces
the peak energy demand on the grid as illustrated in Fig. 3, and
the peak-to-average load ratio is reduced by 30.74% compared
to the baseline. Moreover, the proposed system can deliver
nearly 10% social cost reduction compared to the baseline.
As per Fig. 2, when the users P have little PV energy
(before 09:00 and after 16:00), the retailer sells grid energy to
the users at a higher price than the grid price. At other times,
the retailer buys energy from the users with a lower price than
the grid price. Hence, with 25% participating users, the system
provides a cumulative payoff of 520 AU cents to the retailer.
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Fig. 2. Variation of the grid and SES electricity prices in the proposed system
compared to the baseline with 25% participating users (i.e.,10).
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Fig. 3. Load variation on the grid with 25% participating users.
B. Participating Users versus Non-participating Users
The primary incentive for a user to become a participating
user is a reduction in their energy cost. Fig. 4 depicts the
variation of average daily energy costs for the users P and N
as the number of users in P increases. The figure shows that
the users P benefit more than the users N for all percentages
of the users P . When the number of users P increases, the
greater demand on the SES leads to a greater price of the SES
provider. Concurrently, the grid energy price for the users A
increases because the SES price is equal to the price used
by the retailer to trade grid energy with the users A (see
Section IV-B). Hence, the average costs for the users P and
N increase when the number of users P increases. However,
users in N who pay 127 AU cents on average when there
are 10% participating users in the system only have to pay
121 AU cents on average by participating in the system when
there are 90% participating users. Hence, it is beneficial for a
user in N to become a user in P in the proposed system.
C. Proposed System versus Competitive System
Here, the performance of the proposed system is compared
to the competitive energy trading system proposed in [7] where
the objective is to minimize individual energy costs of the
users P and maximize the revenue for the SES provider.
The solution in [7] is incapable of producing a payoff to
an intermediary electricity retailer because there is no price
differentiation for grid energy traded by the participating users.
In contrast, the proposed system produces a non-negative
payoff to a retailer due to the price difference between the
grid and the users A (see (25)) while minimizing the social
cost in (11) and maximizing the revenue for the SES provider.
In Fig. 5, the community cost is the sum of the energy costs
of the three entities: the SES provider, the users P , and the
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Fig. 4. Average daily energy costs of participating and non-participating users
in the proposed system with different fractions of participating users.
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Fig. 5. Energy cost and revenue comparison with different fractions of
participating users. Proposed system (PS), competitive system (CS).
retailer. Since part of the cost incurred by the SES provider
is a profit to the users P and part of the cost incurred by the
users P produces a payoff to the retailer (see (14), (25), and
(26)), the community cost in the proposed system is given by∑
t∈T pg(t)
(
es(t) + EA(t)
)
− ps(t)EN (t). Note that when
there are 20% participating users, energy discharged by the
SES to the grid during peak hours leads to a lower total
grid energy load,
(
es(t) + EA(t)
)
, than that of the users
N , EN (t), during peak hours. As a result, community cost
becomes negative with 20% participating users. In each case
in Fig. 5, the proposed system has a lower community cost
than in the competitive system. The retailer can also benefit
in the proposed system whereas the retailer in the competitive
system does not receive a positive payoff. Hence, the proposed
system provides a more economically viable solution for the
energy trading scenario by creating a better trade-off of cost
benefits among the SES provider, the users P , and the retailer.
Similar to [7], simulation experiments revealed that, in the
proposed system, users with more surplus energy in P pay a
lower energy cost compared to users with less surplus energy.
In general, a higher peak-to-average load ratio reduction is
preferable as it indicates a flattened load profile on the grid
[16]. Fig. 6 depicts when the fraction of participating users in
the proposed system increases from 5% to 100%, the peak-
to-average load ratio reduction on the grid compared to the
baseline improves from 28% to 45%. The competitive system
displays a similar trend because the equilibrium energy trading
transactions (the SES and grid energy transactions of the users
P) of the two systems present a similar behavior.
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Fig. 6. Peak-to-average ratio reductions compared to the baseline system with
different fractions of participating users.
D. Imperfect Energy Forecasts and the Proposed System
As a preliminary study in exploring the effects of imperfect
energy forecasts on the system performance, proportional
variance white noise errors were introduced to PV power
generation and energy demand forecasts. When averaged over
a large number of simulations, the mean absolute percentage
error (MAPE) of energy forecasts is equal to half of percentage
white noise variance [7]. With 60% participating users in the
system, as MAPE increases from 0% to 50%, community cost
increased from 1020 AU cents to 1319 AU cents, and for each
5% increase of MAPE, community cost increased by nearly
15 AU cents. This is mainly because the retailer’s revenue
generated from the non-participating users’ energy transactions
reduced as MAPE increases. However, as MAPE changes
from 0% to 50%, the average daily costs for the users P
remained nearly unchanged, at 108 AU cents, with a variance
less than 0.0002 AU cents2. This demonstrates participating
user costs are unaffected by the forecast errors. Similar trends
were observed when changing the percentage of participating
users from 20% to 100% in 10% steps.
VI. CONCLUSION
The energy trading interaction between a shared energy
storage (SES) system and users with non-dispatchable energy
generation for demand-side management of a neighborhood
area network (NAN) can be studied by minimizing energy
costs of users from a social planner’s perspective. Here,
we have investigated an energy trading system among an
SES provider, users with non-dispatchable energy generation,
and an electricity retailer for demand-side management of a
NAN. By exploiting the insights of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism and Stackelberg game theory, we have developed
the system to minimize social energy cost for the users and
maximize revenue for the SES provider. It has been shown
that the proposed system possesses incentive-compatibility for
the users by rewarding them in return for disclosing true
energy usage information and provides benefits to the retailer
in addition to the SES provider and the users.
Future research directions include investigating a stochastic
model to incorporate energy forecast errors with the pro-
posed system, extending the system to accommodate addi-
tional constraints including secure grid voltage levels with
energy generation and demand fluctuations, and exploring a
price differentiation strategy between participating and non-
participating users to encourage participation in the system.
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